Hindustan Times ·
The US’s emerging contest with China in Latin America
Trump is expanding US security and strategic influence in Latin America to counter China, but Beijing’s economic grip on the region remains strong.
The second Donald Trump administration’s National Security Strategy highlights “enlist and expand” as the US’s primary strategy to engage with Latin American countries. This seeks to end external influence in the Western hemisphere and expand the US’s footprint through political influence, security, and trade. Its early progress suggests a deliberate sequence.
The US is Latin America’s largest trading partner. However, China is following suit, having surpassed the US in several South American countries in trade value over the last few years. Its expansion focused on critical minerals, infrastructure, and clean energy, grew from roughly $296 billion in 2020 to over $500 billion by 2024. Beijing reaffirmed this commitment to the region at the 12th China-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) Infrastructure Cooperation Forum in June 2026, underlining the depth of its economic influence in this part of the globe.
Faced with such engagement from Beijing and the prospects that come with it, the Trump administration appears to have accepted that the US cannot quickly outpace China on trade and investment. Instead, it aims to expand security cooperation and political alignment, while building narrower economic security leverages in critical minerals, ports, and maritime routes. These may not counter Chinese influence immediately, but they position the US to secure its interests over the long-term.
The US-led critical minerals framework highlights this approach, with 11 partner States, including four from Latin America. The framework aims at loosening Beijing’s influence over critical minerals globally. It includes a guaranteed price floor for Argentine lithium and separate reciprocal trade agreements with El Salvador, Ecuador, and Argentina aimed at restricting Chinese State firms. The contested sale of Panama’s canal-side ports to a consortium led by an American asset manager extends the same logic to strategic infrastructure.
The US’s moves have had considerable impact on some Chinese interests in the region. In Panama, authorities annulled two Chinese port concessions and seized the terminals in early 2026. In Chile, the transport ministry rescinded the approval for a $500-million China Mobile submarine cable under pressure from Washington.
Security cooperation has expanded alongside these economic measures. In April 2025, the US and Panama concluded a security pact that permits a rotational American military presence around the canal. Washington followed this up in late 2025, with arrangements with Guyana, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, the Dominican Republic, and Ecuador for access to their air and naval facilities. Peru was granted a non-NATO ally status as the Trump administration approved large arms packages, including the sale of F-16s to both Peru and Argentina.